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Abstract
This paper investigates the e®ect of a local public enterprise on locations of ¯rms and welfare
in an interregional mixed duopoly. We employ a spatial model (linear city model) by dividing a
linear city into two districts and assume that there are two ¯rms each of which has di®erent home
district. One of them is a local public enterprise owned by the local government which reigns over
one of the districts, while the other is a private ¯rm. The local public enterprise is characterized as
the one which maximizes welfare of its own district. We show that our two-stage game composed
of the location choice and the price competition has two types of equilibria. One is that the two
¯rms are located in the di®erent districts and the other is that they are in the same district whose
local government owns the local public enterprise. We consider the equilibrium selection problem.
Moreover, we examine the changes in ownership of ¯rms as the central or local government policy.
JEL classi¯cation: L13; L32; R32; R59
Keywords: local public enterprise; interregional mixed duopoly; spatial model
1 Introduction
This paper investigates the e®ect which a local public enterprise has on a mixed market in an interregional
mixed duopoly. More precisely, we consider the market in which a private ¯rm competes against a public
¯rm owned by a local government which aims at maximizing its own welfare (local welfare). We employ
a spatial model and examine location patterns in equilibrium. Besides, we explore the e®ect which the
decentralization of government in public enterprise has on social welfare.
The studies of mixed markets with private and public ¯rms began with Merrill and Schneider (1966),
and in response to the global trend of privatization of state-owned enterprises in the 1980s,1 the number
of the researches which analyze the mixed markets has increased over the last two decades. The seminal
work of De Fraja and Delbono (1989) introduced game theory into the study and many researchers have
taken into account the strategic interaction between public and private ¯rms when they analyze the
markets. However, little attention has been directed at local public enterprises. Although many local
public enterprises exist in reality, most of the studies assume that public ¯rms are state-owned.
¤We wish to thank Toshihiro Matsumura, Dan Sasaki and the participants at the seminar at University of Tokyo, for
their helpful comment.
yCorresponding author, Graduate School of Economics, Waseda University E-mail: tomo-ino@suou.waseda.jp
zPolitical Science and Economics, Waseda University E-mail: kami-jo@suou.waseda.jp
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1Examples of such privatization are; British Petroleum[1979] and British Aerospace[1981] in UK; Nippon Telegraph and
Telephone Public Corporation[1985] and Japan Monopoly Corporation[1985] in Japan; Deutsche Bundespost[1989, 1994]
in Germany.
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In this paper we consider the mixed market in which a local public ¯rm and a private ¯rm compete.
We employ a Hotelling (1929) type spatial model in order to explain clearly the di®erence in the region
over which the central government and the local government reign. We suppose that the ¯rms make
decision on their locations and prices of their products along with other literature which adopts the
spatial model.
Some works on mixed oligopoly employed the spatial model (see e.g., Cremer et al., 1991; Matsumura
and Matsushima, 2003, 2004; Matsushima and Matsumura, 2003; Li, 2006) and Cremer et al. (1991) is
the pioneering work in this ¯eld. They assume that state-owned and private ¯rms exist in a linear city
and the ¯rms decide their locations and prices.2 We extend their model by dividing the linear city into
two symmetric districts, Region A and B, each of which is reigned over by a local government, and thus
the ¯rm owned by the government is regarded as a local public enterprise.
The critical di®erence between Cremer et al. (1991) and this paper is the owner of the public enterprise.
In Cremer et al. (1991) the owner is the central government while in this paper it is the local government.
We suppose that the local government of Region A owns the public ¯rm and the owners of the private
¯rm reside in Region B. In addition, we also assume that the public ¯rm aims at maximizing local welfare
in Region A and the local welfare does not include the pro¯t of the private ¯rm. Since the public ¯rm
and the private ¯rm are related to a di®erent region, we describe the situation as an interregional mixed
duopoly.
In this interregional mixed duopoly, we construct a two-stage game which consists of location choice
stage and price setting stage. We show that there exist two types of equilibria in the game. In one
equilibrium E1, each ¯rm is located in its home region (i.e., the local public ¯rm is in Region A and the
private ¯rm is in Region B) and, in the other equilibrium E2, both ¯rms are located in Region A. We
show that E2 payo® dominates E1 while social welfare in E2 is lower than in E1, viz., E1 is the socially
desirable equilibrium whereas E2 is the payo® dominant equilibrium. Thus, we consider the equilibrium
selection by means of risk dominance criterion. Under this criterion, E1 is more realized than E2 by the
decisions of rational agents.
We also consider a decentralization problem on the ownership of the public enterprise in order to
clarify the nature of vertical relationship between the central and local government in the mixed duopoly.
Comparing three policies of the central government: nationalization, decentralization and privatization of
the ownership of the ¯rm in the view of maximizing social welfare, we show that the government selects
the nationalization. In addition, we investigate the horizontal relationship between local governments by
analyzing the decision of each government on whether to privatize its own ¯rm when there is strategic
interaction between governments.3
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we explain our basic framework
of the spatial model. In Section 3, we explore the subgame perfect equilibrium for the two-stage game:
In the ¯rst stage, each ¯rm chooses its location and, in the second, the ¯rms compete in price. Section
4 discusses the properties of two types of equilibria and further discussions about the e®ects of the
decentralization and privatization are done in Section 5. We conclude in Section 6.
2In their models, the state-owned ¯rm indicates the ¯rm which maximizes welfare of the whole city (social welfare). For
instance, Cremer et al. (1991) analyzes how social welfare is a®ected by the number of state-owned and private ¯rms.
3B¶arcena-Ruiz and Garz¶on (2005) also considers the strategic privatization of public ¯rms in the context of international
trade.
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2 Model
We consider the spatial model where there is a linear city of length one represented by the interval [0; 1]
and consumers are uniformly distributed on that city with density one. This city consists of two districts,
[0; 1=2) and [1=2; 1], which are called Region A and Region B respectively.
There are two ¯rms which produce a homogeneous product at zero cost. One ¯rm, indexed by A, is
owned by the local government of Region A and the other, indexed by B, is owned by private shareholders
in Region B. Let a 2 [0; 1] and b 2 [0; 1] denote the locations of Firm A and B respectively. We assume
that the consumers purchase one unit of the product irrespective of its price. To purchase the product,
the consumers must incur the transportation cost in addition to the mill price. Thus, for instance, a
consumer living at point y 2 [0; 1] incurs the transportation cost of t(y ¡ a)2 and the mill price PA
when she purchases the product from Firm A.4 Since both ¯rms produce a homogeneous product, each
consumer patronizes the ¯rm with the lower full price, i.e., the sum of the transportation cost and the
mill price.
For any a 2 [0; 1] and b 2 [0; 1], let x denote the location of the consumer who bears the same full
price from either of the two ¯rms. This marginal location x is determined as the solution of the following
equation:
PA + t(x¡ a)2 = PB + t(x¡ b)2;
where Pi (i = A;B) is the price of Firm i. Thus, when a 6= b, x is given by
x =
a+ b
2
+
PA ¡ PB
2(a¡ b)t : (1)
If Firm A is located in the left of the location of Firm B, i.e., a < b, the consumers who live in the left
side of x purchase from Firm A while the ones, living in the right side of x, purchase from Firm B, and
vice versa. Accordingly, the demand for Firm A's product is given by
DA(PA; PB ; a; b) =
(
x if a < b;
1¡ x if a > b:
The demand for Firm B's product is de¯ned by the total demand minus the demand for Firm A's, that
is, DB = 1¡DA. Only when a = b, the demand for each ¯rm drastically changes. Thus, we mention the
case when a = b after the explanation of a 6= b.
Since there is no ¯xed cost, the pro¯t of each ¯rm is expressed by
¦i = PiDi i = A;B: (2)
Social welfare W is de¯ned by
W =
8<: ¡
R x
0
t(a¡ z)2dz ¡ R 1
x
t(b¡ z)2dz if a · b;
¡ R x
0
t(b¡ z)2dz ¡ R 1
x
t(a¡ z)2dz otherwise:
(3)
Individual demands being perfectly inelastic, so positive prices (i.e., the prices above marginal costs)
do not create distortions in the allocation of resources. Thus, maximizing social welfare is equivalent
to minimizing the total transportation cost. The sum of the transportation costs of all the consumers
depends on the locations of two ¯rms, and so does social welfare. Note that, when a = b, social welfare
is also represented by Equation (3).
4The value of t (> 0) does not matter to the analysis in this paper.
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Table 1: the classi¯cation of four cases (a 6= b)
location marginal consumer WA ¦A TA CA
Case 1 x ¸ 1=2 F1
R 1=2
0
t(a¡ z)2dz PA=2
Case 2
a < b
x < 1=2 F2
PAx
R x
0
t(a¡ z)2dz
PAx+ PB(1=2¡ x)
+
R 1=2
x
t(b¡ z)2dz
Case 3 x ¸ 1=2 F3
R 1=2
0
t(b¡ z)2dz PB=2
Case 4
a > b
x < 1=2 F4
PA(1¡ x)
R x
0
t(b¡ z)2dz
PBx+ PA(1=2¡ x)
+
R 1=2
x
t(a¡ z)2dz
Next, we consider local welfare of Region A. In contrast to social welfare, local welfare is a®ected
by the ¯rm's pro¯t and the prices of the products which are borne by local residents. Accordingly, local
welfare of Region A is expressed by
WA = ¦A ¡ TA ¡ CA;
where TA and CA respectively denote the total transportation cost and the total mill price which are
borne by the residents in Region A. Note that ¦A, TA and CA vary along with the locations of the two
¯rms and the corresponding marginal location x. These relations are summarized in Table 1. Let Fi
denote WA in Case i (i = 1; 2; 3; 4). In other words, WA = Fi when Case i.
Since W =WA +WB , local welfare of Region B is given by
WB =W ¡WA: (4)
We consider the following standard two-stage game: In the ¯rst stage, each ¯rm chooses its location
simultaneously and in the second stage, the ¯rms choose their prices simultaneously. We assume that
each ¯rm can locate any point in the interval [0; 1] without any restriction. In other words, we do not
assume a < b.
While Firm B maximizes its pro¯t, Firm A, which is owned by the government of Region A, aims at
maximizing local welfare of Region A, i.e., WA.
In the remainder of this section, we consider the case when a = b. In this case, every consumer incurs
the same transportation cost, and thus the demands for both ¯rms' products are a®ected only by the
prices they set. We assume that the total demand is equally divided to both ¯rms in the case of PA = PB .
The demand function for Firm A is given by
DA(PA; PB ; a; b) =
8><>:
0 if PA > PB ;
1
2 if PA = PB ;
1 if PA < PB ;
when a = b. Besides, DB = 1¡DA. The pro¯t of each ¯rm is represented by Equation (2) again. In this
case, the equilibrium price of each ¯rm is zero by the above particular demand function. We explain it
here to simplify the analysis in the next section.
Firm B, which is a private ¯rm and thus maximizes its own pro¯t, always chooses the price which
is slightly lower than PA.5 For this reason, Firm B does not have the optimal strategy in price setting
game as long as PA > 0. Consequently, PA = PB = 0 is a unique equilibrium when a = b.
5In the case of PA < PB , Firm B can capture the entire demand of the market. Thus, such price setting has a substantial
e®ect on the pro¯t of Firm B.
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In addition, when a = b, WA = TA since PA = PB = 0 in equilibrium. Thus, if a = b,
WA = ¡
Z 1=2
0
t(a¡ z)2dz:
Local welfare of Region B is represented by Equation (4) again.
3 Results
3.1 Price competition
Given ¯rms' locations a, b chosen at the ¯rst stage, the two ¯rms compete on price at the second stage of
our two-stage game. Since the objectives of two ¯rms vary along with their locations, we must separate
two cases to analyze the equilibrium: (I) a > b and (II) b < a. At this moment, we do not consider the
case of (III) a = b because we have know that PA = PB = 0 is a unique equilibrium.
Let us denote the objectives of two ¯rms in (I) and (II) as U ji (PA; PB); i = A;B; j = I; II. Then,
the ¯rst order conditions for the maximizations are as follows.
@U jA
@PA
= 0;
@U jB
@PB
= 0:
The reaction functions of ¯rm A and B, denoted by rjA(PB) and r
j
B(PA) respectively, satisfy
@U jA
@PA
(rjA(PB); PB) = 0;
@U jB
@PB
(PA; r
j
B(PA)) = 0:
The equilibrium price of the second stage is de¯ned by the ¯xed point of the composite function of the
two reaction functions. In other words, P ¤A = r
j
A(r
j
B(P
¤
A)) holds.
(I) a < b. This case corresponds to Case 1 and 2 in Table 1. Since a < b, we obtain
F1 ¡ F2 = ¡ (PA ¡ PB + ®)
2
4(b¡ a)t · 0;
where Fi is local welfare of Region A in Case i and ® := (b¡ a)(1¡ a¡ b)t. Thus F1 < F2 holds unless
PA = ePA := PB ¡ ®. In addition, it is easily veri¯ed that F1 and F2 are the concave functions in PA,
and moreover,
@F1
@PA
¯¯¯¯
PA= ePA=
@F2
@PA
¯¯¯¯
PA= ePA=
PB ¡ ®
2(a¡ b)t = ¡
ePA
2(b¡ a)t :
We have Figure 1 which represents the relationship of F1 and F2. The thin and thick curves denote F1
and F2 respectively. Since the signs of the slopes of F1 and F2 at ePA are changed according to the sign
of ePA, we have to separate two cases.
Further, Equation (1) and Table 1 imply that, under a < b,(
PA · ePA () x ¸ 12 =) Case 1 and WA = F1;
PA > ePA () x < 12 =) Case 2 and WA = F2;
and PA = ePA () x = 1=2. The curves with shaded portion in Figure 1 represent local welfare WA.
Thus, the maximum of WA is attained by the maximization of F2 when ePA < 0 and by the maximization
of F1 when ePA ¸ 0. By the ¯rst order conditions for maximization of F1 and F2, we obtain
rIA(PB) =
(
PB¡®
2 if ePA ¸ 0 (PB ¸ ®);
0 otherwise:
(5)
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In contrast with Firm A, the objective of Firm B is U IB = ¦B = PB(1¡ x) irrespective of Case 1 or
2. Thus, we have, by the ¯rst order condition of maximizing U IB ,
6
rIB(PA) =
PA ¡ (a¡ b)(2¡ a¡ b)t
2
: (6)
Equations (5) and (6) yield the equilibrium prices as follows:
P 1A(a; b) = ¡
(a¡ b)(a+ b)t
3
; P 1B(a; b) = ¡
(a¡ b)(3¡ a¡ b)t
3
:
Superscript 1 indicates that the equilibrium holds for the range of Case 1 (x ¸ 1=2).
(II) a > b. This corresponds to Case 3 and 4 in Table 1. We obtain, by a > b,
F3 ¡ F4 = ¡ (PA ¡ PB + ®)
2
4(a¡ b)t · 0:
Thus, F3 < F4 holds except for the case that PA = ePA. Further, both F3 and F4 are concave in PA and
@F3
@PA
¯¯¯¯
PA= ePA=
@F4
@PA
¯¯¯¯
PA= ePA= ¡
PB ¡ ¯
2(a¡ b)t ;
where ¯ := (a¡ b)(a+ b)t > 0. We have Figure 2 which represents the relationship of F3 and F4. In this
¯gure, the thin and thick curves represent F3 and F4 respectively. Note that, the signs of the slopes of
F3 and F4 at PA = ePA vary according to the sign of PB ¡ ¯, and so we have to separate two cases.
Equation (1) and Table 1 imply that under a > b,(
PA ¸ ePA () x ¸ 12 =) Case 3 and WA = F3;
PA < ePA () x < 12 =) Case 4 and WA = F4;
and PA = ePA () x = 1=2. The curves with shaded portion represent local welfare WA. Thus, we
have, by the maximization of F3 and F4,
rIIA (PB) =
(
PB+(a¡b)(2¡a¡b)t
2 if PB < ¯;
(a¡ b)t otherwise: (7)
WA WA
PA PA
(Case 1) (Case 2) (Case 1) (Case 2)
x ¸ 1=2 x < 1=2 x ¸ 1=2 x < 1=2
0
ePA < 0
F2
F1
F2
F1ePA ePA
ePA ¸ 0
0 rIA(PB)jj
rIA(PB)
Figure 1: local welfare of Region A in (I) a < b
6The second order condition is satis¯ed.
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WA WA
PA PA
(Case 4) (Case 3) (Case 4) (Case 3)
x < 1=2 x ¸ 1=2 x < 1=2 x ¸ 1=2
rIIA (PB)r
II
A (PB)
PB < ¯ PB ¸ ¯
F4
F3
F4
F3ePA ePA
Figure 2: local welfare of Region A in (II) a > b
Finally, the objective of ¯rm B is U IIB = ¦B = PBx and we have, by the maximization of ¦B ,
7
rIIB (PA) =
PA + (a¡ b)(a+ b)t
2
: (8)
By Equations (7) and (8), we have Figure 3 which represents the relationship of the two reaction
curves when a > b. Since the reaction curve of ¯rm A is kinked at PB = ¯, there are two kinds of possible
intersection. As is shown in Figure 3, when ¯ > (a¡ b)t () a+ b > 1, the intersection is attained in
the area of PA < ¯ and PB < ¯. On the other hand, when ¯ · (a¡ b)t () a+ b · 1, the intersection
is in PA ¸ ¯ and PB ¸ ¯. Thus, we obtain the equilibrium prices as follows:8<: P
3
A(a; b) =
(a¡b)(4¡a¡b)t
3 ; P
3
B(a; b) =
(a¡b)(2+a+b)t
3 if a+ b > 1;
P 4A(a; b) = (a¡ b)t; P 4B(a; b) = (a¡b)(1+a+b)t2 otherwise:
Superscripts 3 and 4 indicate that the equilibria hold for the ranges of Case 3 (x ¸ 1=2) and Case 4
(x < 1=2) respectively.
PB
PA
a+ b · 1
rIIB (PA)
PB
PA
a+ b > 1
rIIB (PA)
rIIA (PB)
rIIA (PB)
P 3A(a; b)
P 3B(a; b) P
4
B(a; b)
P 4A(a; b)
¯ ¯
¯ ¯
(a¡b)(2¡a¡b)t
2
(a¡b)(2¡a¡b)t
2
(a¡b)(a+b)t
2
(a¡b)(a+b)t
2
O O
Figure 3: the reaction curves in price competition (in (II) a > b)
These results are summarized as the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The relation between the locations a; b and the equilibrium prices in the second stage is as
follows:
7The second order condition holds.
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(I) a < b
P 1A(a; b) = ¡
(a¡ b)(a+ b)t
3
; P 1B(a; b) = ¡
(a¡ b)(3¡ a¡ b)t
3
:
(II) a > b (
P 3A(a; b) =
(a¡b)(4¡a¡b)t
3 ; P
3
B(a; b) =
(a¡b)(2+a+b)t
3 if a+ b > 1;
P 4A(a; b) = (a¡ b)t; P 4B(a; b) = (a¡b)(1+a+b)t2 otherwise:
(III) a = b.
PA(a; b) = 0; PB(a; b) = 0:
The superscript j of the equilibrium price P ji (a; b) corresponds to the Case j in Table 1.
Let Pj(a; b) denote the pair of the equilibrium price for Case j (j = 1; 3; 4), (P jA(a; b); P
j
B(a; b)). By
Lemma 1, we have Figure 4 showing the range in which Pj(a; b) holds. The marginal location, in which
the consumer is indi®erent to either of two ¯rms which she purchases the product from, in each case, is
obtained as follows: 8><>:
x1(a; b) = 3+a+b6 if P = P
1(a; b);
x3(a; b) = 2+a+b6 if P = P
3(a; b);
x4(a; b) = 1+a+b4 if P = P
4(a; b):
We ¯nish the preparation of analyzing the location choices in the ¯rst stage and in the next subsection,
we consider the location problem.
O
b
a
a = b
1
1
P4(a; b)
P1(a; b)
P3(a; b)
a+ b = 1
1
2
1
2
Figure 4: the ranges of equilibrium prices
3.2 Location choice
We now consider the location choices of two ¯rms in the ¯rst stage. We see from Figure 4 that if Firm
B is located in [0; 1=2), the equilibrium price of Firm A changes from P 1A(a; b) to P
4
A(a; b) at a = b, and
from P 4A(a; b) to P
3
A(a; b) at a = 1¡ b as a increases. Similarly, if Firm B is located in [1=2; 1], it changes
from P 1A(a; b) to P
3
A(a; b) at a = b as a increases. Accordingly, in order to obtain the reaction function of
Firm A in the ¯rst stage, we need to distinguish the two cases.
First, when b 2 [0; 1=2), the objective of Firm A is given by8
WA =
8>>><>>>:
F1 = P 1A(x
1 ¡ 12 )¡
R 1=2
0
t(a¡ z)2dz if a · b;
F4 =
P 4A
2 ¡ P 4Bx4 ¡
R x4
0
t(b¡ z)2dz ¡ R 1=2
x4
t(a¡ z)2dz if b < a · 1¡ b;
F3 = P 3A(1¡ x3)¡ P
3
B
2 ¡
R 1=2
0
t(b¡ z)2dz otherwise;
(9)
8Henceforth, we omit the argument of the objective functions to simplify the description.
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and when b 2 [1=2; 1],
WA =
8<: F1 = P
1
A(x
1 ¡ 12 )¡
R 1=2
0
t(a¡ z)2dz if a · b;
F3 = P 3A(1¡ x3)¡ P
3
B
2 ¡
R 1=2
0
t(b¡ z)2dz otherwise:
(10)
Thus, we can obtain the reaction function of Firm A as follows:
RA(b) =
(
10¡b¡p73¡20b+4b2
3 if b < ¹b;
¡18¡2b+p378+72b+16b2
6 otherwise;
(11)
where ¹b ¼ 0:3656. See Appendix for the derivation of Equation (11).
If Firm A is located in [0; 1=2), the equilibrium price of Firm B changes from P 4B(a; b) to P
1
B(a; b) at
b = a as b increases. Similarly, if Firm A is located in [1=2; 1], it changes from P 4B(a; b) to P
3
B(a; b) at
b = 1¡ a, and from P 3B(a; b) to P 1B(a; b) at b = a as b increases. Thus, we need to classify the objective
of Firm B into two cases. When a 2 [0; 1=2), the objective is given by
¦B =
(
G4 = P 4Bx
4 if b < a;
G1 = P 1B(1¡ x1) otherwise;
(12)
and when a 2 [1=2; 1],
¦B =
8><>:
G4 = P 4Bx
4 if b · 1¡ a;
G3 = P 3Bx
3 if 1¡ a < b < a;
G1 = P 1B(1¡ x1) otherwise;
(13)
where Gi (i = 1; 3; 4) is the pro¯t of Firm B corresponding to each equilibrium price. We can derive the
reaction function of Firm B as follows:
RB(a) =
(
1 if a < ¹a;
0 otherwise;
(14)
where ¹a ¼ 0:3799. See Appendix for the derivation of Equation (14).
The reaction functions RA(b) and RB(a) are described in Figure 5. RA(b) is jumped at b = ¹b and
RB(a) is jumped at a = ¹a. Therefore, this model has two subgame perfect equilibria, E1 and E2. Let
(a¤i ; b
¤
i ) denote the pair of equilibrium location points in Ei (i = 1; 2). We have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. In the ¯rst stage, there are two equilibria E1 and E2. Each location point is as follows:
E1 :
(
a¤1 =
¡20+p466
6 ¼ 0:2645
b¤1 = 1
E2 :
(
a¤2 =
10¡p73
3 ¼ 0:4853
b¤2 = 0
4 Further discussions on the properties of the two equilibria
4.1 Equilibrium comparison
Theorem 1 shows that our two-stage game has two types of equilibria. While in the equilibrium E1, each
¯rm is located in its home district, in the equilibrium E2, both ¯rms are located in Region A whose
government owns Firm A. Figure 6 describes the locations of two ¯rms in the interval [0; 1] at the two
equilibria. Here, x¤k (k = 1; 2) denotes the position of the marginal consumer who is indi®erent to which
¯rm he purchases from.
The equilibrium payo®s are as follows:
E1 :
8<: Firm A : WA(a
¤
1; b
¤
1) =
(¡9953+466p466)t
1944 ¼ 0:0548t;
Firm B : ¦B(a¤1; b
¤
1) =
(26¡p466)(32¡p466)2t
3888 ¼ 0:1231t;
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Ob
a1
1
¹a
¹b
E2
E1
RB(a)
RA(b)
Figure 5: the reaction curves in location choice
0 1 0 1
E1 E2
a¤1 x
¤
1 b
¤
1 b
¤
2 x
¤
2 a
¤
2
1
2
1
2
Region A Region B Region A Region B
Figure 6: the locations of ¯rms in two types of equilibria
E2 :
8<: Firm A : WA(a
¤
2; b
¤
2) =
(¡604+73p73)t
216 ¼ 0:0913t;
Firm B : ¦B(a¤2; b
¤
2) =
(10¡p73)(13¡p73)2t
216 ¼ 0:1338t:
The above equations show that the equilibrium E2 payo® dominates the equilibrium E1 since both
WA(a¤2; b
¤
2) > WA(a
¤
1; b
¤
1) and ¦B(a
¤
2; b
¤
2) > ¦B(a
¤
1; b
¤
1) hold. We explain the intuition behind this result
below.
First, we consider the equilibrium E1. It is helpful for understanding the intuition behind the equi-
librium that we compare the equilibrium E1 with the equilibrium for location model of two private ¯rms
with a < b. In this case, there is an equilibrium such that private ¯rm, Firm A, is located in point 0
and the other private ¯rm, Firm B, is in point 1. This is because each ¯rm maximizes its pro¯t, and
thus both the ¯rms are unwilling to get up close to each other to cause a severe price competition (see
d'Aspremont et al., 1979).
This maximum di®erentiation is explained by two e®ects in Matsumura and Matsushima (2004). One
is that the demand elasticity for Firm A is reduced as Firm B gets away.9 Then, both the ¯rms can set
higher prices and enjoy higher pro¯ts. This is the direct e®ect. The other is that the higher price of Firm
B raises the price of Firm A by the strategic complementarity in price-setting between the ¯rms. This
second e®ect is the indirect e®ect (strategic e®ect). These two e®ects induce both the private ¯rms to
depart from each other. Therefore, both ¯rms have the incentives for stepping away from each other.
This incentive remains in Firm A even when it is owned by the local government of Region A. However,
its incentive for stepping away and price-raising gets lower than when it is owned privately, because its
pro¯t from the residents of Region A and the purchases costs of them always cancel each other in local
welfare. In addition to this, the local public ¯rm also takes the transportation costs of consumers in
Region A into account, and thus it has an incentive to move from point 0 to the right direction to
decrease the transportation costs of the consumers. Moreover, it has another incentive to move right for
9The following explanation about Firm A is also applicable to Firm B.
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capturing the demand of the consumers in Region B. Since local welfare of Region A consists of the
pro¯t of Firm A and the sum of the transportation costs and the purchases costs which are borne by
the residents in Region A, the increase in sales to the residents in Region B contributes to the increase
in local welfare of Region A. Thus, Firm A has the incentive to move toward Region B for selling its
residents.
The a¤1 is a position such that the above three incentives, one of which has the power to move Firm
A left (stepping away and price-raising), another one (reducing transportation costs) induces it to locate
the center of Region A and the other (capturing the demand of Region B) do it to move to right, balance
and Firm A does not want to move further. In private duopoly, the last incentive is dominated by the
¯rst incentive (stepping away and price-raising), but in our interregional mixed duopoly, this dominance
relationship inverts at point 1=4. Thus, a¤1 is slightly right from point 1=4. On the other hand, Firm B
keeps in point 1 because he has only the preference for stepping away and price-raising.
Second, we explain the equilibrium E2. For facilitating understanding, we compare the equilibrium
with one when Firm A is a private ¯rm and it is located to the right of Firm B, viz., a > b. Then, the
outcome that ¯rm A is located in point 1 and ¯rm B is located in point 0 is supported by an equilibrium.
When Firm A becomes a local public ¯rm for Region A, as is explained in a few paragraphs above, there
are two forces (reducing the transportation costs of residents in Region A and capturing the demand of
residents in Region B) to make the ¯rm moving left from point 1 and one force (stepping away from Firm
B and price-raising) to keep it being that position. Therefore, when a > b, Firm A has the incentive to
move left, and as a result the ¯rm is located in a¤2 whereas Firm B keeps in point 0. Moreover, in this
equilibrium, Firm A sets the relatively high price10 (PA ¼ 0:4853t) since most of the customers for the
¯rm are residents in Region B and it can obtain the pro¯t without imposing majority of the residents in
Region A on the relatively high purchases costs. On the other hand, Firm B sets the relatively low price
(PB ¼ 0:3604t) and gets the large demand from Region A (see Figure 6, x¤2 = (13¡
p
73)=12 ¼ 0:3713).
The structure mentioned above well explains why the equilibrium E2 is preferable for both ¯rms to
the equilibrium E1. This is because in equilibrium E2, both ¯rms obtain the bene¯ts at the sacri¯ce of
consumer surplus in Region B. On the one hand, Firm A receives the direct bene¯t from Region B by
selling the products at the relatively high price. On the other hand, Firm B receives the indirect bene¯t
from Region B because thanks to the high price which Firm A sets, Firm B can sell much to consumers
in Region A.
In the meanwhile, the residents in Region B face the dual hardships. One is, as is explained above,
that they face the high price which Firm A sets. The other is that the transportation costs they incur are
very high since both two ¯rms are located in Region A. Thus, local welfare of Region B in E2 is lower
than in E1. In fact, these hardships for Region B are so serious that, in equilibrium E2, not only local
welfare of Region B but also social welfare decrease compared to the equilibrium E1, as the following
calculations show:
E1 :
8><>:
WB(a¤1; b
¤
1) = ¡ (¡20056+935
p
466)t
1296 ¼ ¡0:0987t;
W (a¤1; b
¤
1) = ¡ (¡40262+1873
p
466)t
3888 ¼ ¡0:0439t;
10The equilibrium prices are as follows:
E1 : (PA(a
¤
1; b
¤
1); PB(a
¤
1; b
¤
1)) =
 
(¡14 +p466)(26¡p466)t
108
;
(32¡p466)(26¡p466)t
108
!
¼ (0:3100t; 0:4255t);
E2 : (PA(a
¤
2; b
¤
2); PB(a
¤
2; b
¤
2)) =
 
(10¡p73)t
3
;
(13¡p73)(10¡p73)t
18
!
¼ (0:4853t; 0:3604t):
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E2 :
8><>:
WB(a¤2; b
¤
2) = ¡7(¡337+40
p
73)t
216 ¼ ¡0:1543t;
W (a¤2; b
¤
2) = ¡ (¡195+23
p
73)t
24 ¼ ¡0:0630t:
Thus, as the summary of this subsection, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The equilibrium E2 Pareto dominates equilibrium E1 with respect to the payo®s of both
¯rms. However, social welfare in E2 is lower than that in E1 because the e±ciency of E2 stands on top
of the sacri¯ce of Region B.
4.2 Equilibrium selection
When a game has several Nash equilibria, a question arises which equilibrium they actually play. The
2£2 bimatrix normal form game in Table 2 describes a situation that each player has to choose one from
two actions which corresponds to the two equilibria respectively. For instance, if their choice is (a¤1; b
¤
1)
(resp. (a¤2; b
¤
2)), they succeed in coordinating their actions which achieve E1 (resp. E2). However, if they
have di®erent prospects each other, neither of equilibria occur.
Table 2: the game of equilibrium selection
PPPPPPPPPFirm A
Firm B
b¤1 b
¤
2
a¤1 (0:0548t; 0:1231t) (0:0645t; 0:0529t)
a¤2 (0:0250t; 0:0656t) (0:0913t; 0:1338t)
As Proposition 1 suggests, both players prefer (a¤2; b
¤
2) to (a
¤
1; b
¤
1), and thus from the payo® dominance
criterion, they likely choose their actions which constitute equilibrium E2. This seems to be considered as
a negative result by welfare economists because as Proposition 1 also suggests, social welfare of the whole
area in E2 is worse than that in E1. The payo® dominance criterion, however, passes over the players'
consideration for the risk that they may fail to coordinate their actions. A notion of risk dominance by
Harsanyi and Selten (1988) is the very concept that captures players' risk consideration. In the language
of Harsanyi and Selten (1988), in a 2£ 2 bimatrix game with two strict Nash equilibria, one equilibrium
risk dominates another if the product of deviation losses at the former is greater than that at the latter.
In the game of Table 2, the product of deviation losses of (a¤1; b
¤
1) is
(0:0548t¡ 0:0250t)(0:1231t¡ 0:0529t) ¼ 0:0021t2;
and that of (a¤2; b
¤
2) is
(0:0913t¡ 0:0645t)(0:1338t¡ 0:0656t) ¼ 0:0018t2:
Hence, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2. While the equilibrium E2 payo® dominates the equilibrium E1, the equilibrium E1 risk
dominates the equilibrium E2.
5 Decentralization of government and privatization
Our analysis has some implications on a world wide trend toward decentralization of government to local
jurisdictions. In such a case, the central government turns over the ownership of a public ¯rm to the local
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government. The transfer of the ownership changes the objective of that ¯rm, and thus changes social
welfare. Although there are many researches which consider the changes of ¯rm's ownership from the
central government to the private sector (viz., privatization), the changes from the central government to
the local one have been paid less attention by the researchers who concern the recent wave of privatization.
We provide the two scenarios on decentralization of government and changes in ¯rms' ownership.
These two scenarios are considered in order to capture essential situations in terms of the decentralization
of the central government. One is a decision problem for the central government. On promotion of the
decentralization, the government faces the decision of appropriately allocating ownership of a public ¯rm.
It must decide whether to give the ownership of the public ¯rm to the local government, privatize the
¯rm, or keep the ownership.
The central government reigns over the linear city [0; 1] which consists of the two districts [0; 1=2)
and [1=2; 1]. In each of them, a local government exists. In an initial situation, a public ¯rm owned by
the central government and a private ¯rm compete in this linear city. They play the two-stage game
composed of the location choice and the price competition. Such a situation was analyzed by Cremer et
al. (1991). According to their results, the two ¯rms are located at points 1=4 and 3=4, and set the same
price of t=2. Further, social welfare is ¡t=48 ¼ ¡0:0208t, which is the maximum value because the total
transportation cost in the market is minimized.
If the central government gives the ownership of the public ¯rm to one of the local governments (we
de¯ne this change in ownership as localization), competition between the local public ¯rm and the private
¯rm occurs. As we showed in previous sections, in equilibrium, social welfare is ¡0:0439t (we adopt the
risk dominance equilibrium E1). Finally, if the central government privatizes the public ¯rm, this is the
location choice model analyzed by d'Aspremont et al. (1979). One ¯rm is located at point 0 and the
other is at point 1, and social welfare is ¡t=12 ¼ ¡0:0833t.
In summary, the decision problem faced by the central government can be described as Table 3. Thus,
we have the following proposition.
Table 3: the choice of the central government and social welfare
nationalization localization privatization
social welfare ¡0:0208t ¡0:0439t ¡0:0833t
Proposition 3. Assume that the central government concerns social welfare and it has the three choices
on the ownership of the public ¯rm: nationalization, localization and privatization. Then, he selects the
nationalization of the ¯rm.
The other is a decision problem for the local government. In this case, there are two local governments
which reign over the neighboring regions and each of them owns a ¯rm. Each government has the option
of changing the ownership of the ¯rm: nationalize, privatize, and holding the status quo. After the choice,
the two ¯rms play the two-stage game considered in the previous sections.
The local governments A and B reign over the two districts [0; 1=2) and [1=2; 1], respectively. If
both governments keep their ownership of the ¯rms, then two local public ¯rms compete in the market
considered in our companion paper (Inoue et al., 2007). We ¯nd that the two-stage game composed of
the location choice and the price competition stages has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which
each local public ¯rm is located at the center of its own district (Firm A is at point 1=4, and Firm B
is at point 3=4), and each local welfare is ¡t=96 ¼ ¡0:0104t. Note that, in this case, social welfare (W
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¼ ¡0:0208t) is equal to the case where a state-owned ¯rm and a private ¯rm compete (see Cremer et al.,
1991).
If one government decides to nationalize its ¯rm and the other does not, there are two types of ¯rms
in the market, a state-owned ¯rm and a local public ¯rm. Solving the two-stage game, we obtain a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium which completely coincides with the equilibrium by the above competition
of local public ¯rms. Moreover, if both governments nationalize their ¯rms, there are two state-owned
¯rms in the market. In this case, both the ¯rms aim at maximizing social welfare, in equilibrium, Firm
A is located at 1=4 and Firm B is at 3=4 (where a < b). Thus, the equilibrium in this case also coincides
with the former case.
On the other hand, if one government decide to privatize its public ¯rm and the other does not, this is
a situation considered in this paper. Further, if both governments privatize their ¯rms, the competition
between the two private ¯rms appears. This case is analyzed by d'Aspremont et al. (1979).
Thus, the decision situation faced by the two local governments are described as the following payo®
matrix. This game has four Nash equilibria such that both ¯rms select the \status quo" or \nationalize."
The following proposition holds.
Table 4: the game of privatizationXXXXXXXXXXXXRegion A
Region B
privatize status quo nationalize
privatize (¡0:0417t; ¡0:0417t) (¡0:0987t; 0:0548t) (¡0:0104t; ¡0:0104t)
status quo (0:0548t; ¡0:0987t) (¡0:0104t; ¡0:0104t) (¡0:0104t; ¡0:0104t)
nationalize (¡0:0104t; ¡0:0104t) (¡0:0104t; ¡0:0104t) (¡0:0104t; ¡0:0104t)
Proposition 4. When each local government decides the ownership of its public ¯rm, they both do not
privatize the ¯rm. Then, social welfare is maximized.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we investigate a mixed duopoly involving a private ¯rm and a local public ¯rm which is
owned by a local government. We construct a two-stage game and show that the game has two subgame
perfect equilibria (E1 and E2). One of them (E1) is that each ¯rm is located in its home district, and
the other (E2) is that both ¯rms are located in the same region, Region A.
We also ¯nd that equilibrium E2 payo® dominates E1, but social welfare in E2 is lower than in E1
because the burden of Region B in E2 is much heavier than that in E1. On the other hand, equilibrium
E1 risk dominates E2. In these two types of equilibria, three following incentives balance at the location
point of Firm A. One is the incentive for departing from Firm B for avoiding the severe price competition.
Second one is that the ¯rm wishes to decrease the transportation costs of the residents in Region A. The
last one is the inducement of capturing the demand of residents in Region B. Only the ¯rst one makes
Firm A be located far from Firm B and the other two make Firm A get close to Firm B. On the other
hand, the private ¯rm B has only this incentive, and thus the ¯rm is located in the corner point in both
equilibria.
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We introduce a local public enterprise into the analysis of mixed markets while most of the literature
on mixed oligopoly treat a public ¯rm as state-owned. In addition to this, we analyze the strategic
decisions of each government by considering multiple regions as B¶arcena-Ruiz and Garz¶on (2005). Our
setting can be applied in the context of an international relationships such as the location choice of
multinationals. In that context, equilibrium E2 indicates a foreign ¯rm's direct investment. As pointed
by B¶arcena-Ruiz and Garz¶on (2005), particularly in the EU, although the Single Market was introduced,
the decision whether to privatize ¯rms or not is a national issue. Thus, there are strategic interactions
among member countries in the market. We consider the privatization game between two governments
of local districts in Section 5. In consequence, both governments does not privatize their own ¯rms. This
result goes against the recent privatization trend. If we take a cost improvement into account in the e®ect
of the privatization, the trend might be shown. Accordingly, the analysis of the situation which both
¯rms select the production costs endogenously such as Matsumura and Matsushima (2004) is a further
subject for future research.
This model is restrictive since we employ a simple duopoly model. However, This paper has a sig-
ni¯cant impact on the argument of the mixed oligopoly for the above reason. Moreover, this research
might extend to the cases of asymmetric regions and a quantity-setting oligopoly, to consider a variety of
conditions. It is necessary to analyze the mixed oligopoly involving local public ¯rms in order to clarify
the desirable ownership patterns of ¯rms.
Appendix
Derivation of Equation (11)
In Figure 7, we show local welfare of Region A described in Equations (9) and (10). If b < 1=2 (left
¯gure), WA is maximized when a 2 [0; b] (WA = F1) or a 2 (b; 1¡ b] (WA = F4). If b ¸ 1=2 (right ¯gure),
WA is maximized when a 2 [0; b] (WA = F1). In b < 1=2, whether the maximum value of WA exists
in a 2 [0; b] or a 2 (b; 1 ¡ b] depends on the value of b. To derive this condition, we calculate following
equation:
WA(R1A(b); b)¡WA(R4A(b); b)
= ¡ [9(215 + 73° ¡ 42±) + 18b(213¡ 10° ¡ 4±) + 4b
2(27¡ 34b+ 9° ¡ 4±)]t
1944
;
° ´
p
73¡ 4b(5¡ b); ± ´
p
378 + 8b(9 + 2b);
where RjA(b) := argmaxa Fj (j = 1; 4). This equation is a monotonically increasing function of b. In
addition, when b = ¹b ¼ 0:3656, the equation equals to zero. Thus, when b · ¹b, R4A(b) maximizes WA,
otherwise R1A(b) maximizes WA. Hence, in the ¯rst stage, the reaction function of Firm A is expressed
by
RA(b) =
(
10¡b¡p73¡20b+4b2
3 if b < ¹b;
¡18¡2b+p378+72b+16b2
6 otherwise:
Derivation of Equation (14)
In Figure 8, we show the pro¯t of Firm B described in Equations (12) and (13). If a < 1=2 (left ¯gure),
¦B is maximized when b = 0 (¦B = G4) or b = 1 (¦B = G1). If a ¸ 1=2 (right ¯gure), ¦B is maximized
when b = 0 (¦B = G4). In a < 1=2, whether the maximum value of ¦B exists at b = 0 or b = 1 depends
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0 a
WA
1b 1¡ b
b < 1=2 : (9)
R4A(b)
F1 F4
F3
F1
F3
WA
0 RA(b) b 1 a
b ¸ 1=2 : (10)
R1A(b)
Figure 7: derivation of Equation (11)
on the value of a. To derive this condition, we calculate following equation:
¦B(a;R1B(a))¡¦B(a;R4B(a)) =
(16¡ 41a+ 2a2 ¡ 13a3)t
72
;
where RjB(b) := argmaxb Gj (j = 1; 4). This equation is a monotonically decreasing function of a. In
addition, when a = ¹a ¼ 0:3799, the equation equals to zero. Thus, when a < ¹a, R1B(a) maximizes ¦B ,
otherwise R4B(a) maximizes ¦B . Hence, in the ¯rst stage, the reaction function of Firm B is expressed
by
RB(a) =
(
1 if a < ¹a;
0 otherwise:
ba
¦B
b1
¦B
a1¡ a
a < 1=2 : (12) a ¸ 1=2 : (13)
G4
G3
G1
G4
G1
RB(a)
jj
0
R1B(a)jj
1
R4B(a)jj
0
Figure 8: derivation of Equation (14)
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